In this paper, we propose a new method for detecting cheat in P2P-based MMORPG. We suppose a typical P2P-based event delivery architecture where the entire game space is divided into subareas and a responsible node (selected from player terminals) delivers each event happened in the subarea to player nodes there every predetermined time interval called timeslot. In the proposed method, we introduce multiple monitor nodes (selected from player terminals) which monitor the game state and detect cheat when it happens. In order to allow monitor nodes to track the correct game states for the corresponding subarea, we let monitor nodes and a responsible node retain a random number seed and player nodes send their events not only to responsible node but also monitor nodes so that the monitor nodes and the responsible node can uniquely calculate the latest game state from the previous game state and game events which happened during the current timeslot. Either responsible node, monitor nodes or player nodes can detect cheat by comparing hash values of game state which are retained by those nodes periodically, and role back events happened since the last correct game state. Through experiments in PlanetLab, we show that our method achieves practical performance to detect cheats.
INTRODUCTION
Thanks to recent progress of network technology, we are now able to enjoy network gaming at home using PC, video game console, and so on. However, due to popularization of network game, servers for Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Game (MMORPG) have been highly overloaded. Accordingly, some load distribution methods based on P2P technology have been proposed. While these methods have good scalability to the number of players, they suffer from preventing cheat by malicious players since most of game data such as game state and events are managed by player's terminals. Thus, a new method for preventing cheat on P2P-based gaming architecture is desired.
There are several research efforts for preventing cheat on P2P-based game. In [2] , NEO (New Event Ordering) protocol is proposed. This protocol takes a vote among all players. Since this protocol does not need responsible node, all player nodes share the game state by broadcasting event to each other. So, required bandwidth increases and some player nodes with large delay or low available bandwidth may be excluded from voting. Moreover, since this protocol does not determine the order of received events, it is not guaranteed for all player nodes to always have the same game state.
[3] proposes a method to detect cheat by collating game logs. When a player logs out from the game system, the logs are compared in terms of transmitted packets by responsible node and received packets by the player node. Since this method can detect cheat only when players log out, it takes long time to detect cheat and is difficult to correct game state while the malicious player is committing cheats in the game system.
In this paper, we propose a new method for detecting cheat in MMORPG which supposes typical P2P-based event delivery architecture such as [4] where the entire game space is divided into subareas and a responsible node (selected from player terminals) delivers each event happened in the subarea to player nodes there every predetermined time interval called timeslot. In the proposed method, we introduce multiple monitor nodes (selected from player terminals) which monitor the game state and detect cheat when it happens. In order to allow monitor nodes to track the correct game state for the corresponding subarea, we let monitor nodes and a responsible node retain a random number seed and player nodes send their events not only to responsible node but also to monitor nodes so that the monitor nodes and the Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. responsible node can uniquely calculate the latest game state from the previous game state and game events which happened during the current timeslot. Either responsible node, monitor nodes or player nodes can detect cheat by comparing hash values of game states which are retained by those nodes periodically, and role back events happened since the last correct game state. Depending on the network topology among the responsible/monitor nodes and player nodes, the responsible/monitor nodes may receive events at different timeslots. In the proposed method, responsible/monitor nodes follow majority decision of which events are assigned in the timeslot.
By allocating multiple monitor nodes for each subarea, collusion between the responsible node and monitor nodes can be detected by majority voting. Since only part of nodes participates in voting, the amount of messages can be kept much lower than NEO protocol [2] . Moreover, in the proposed method, since comparison of game state is performed at reasonably short period, the problem in [3] can be avoided.
In order to show usefulness of our method, we have implemented a prototype and conducted some experiments in a WAN testbed called PlanetLab [5] . In the environment where traffic delay between player node and responsible node is about 200 msec., our method could detect cheat in 1 sec., and correct game state in 8 sec., while keeping the extra traffic at player nodes low enough.
PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we first describe the target P2P-based game system in which we want to detect cheats, and then we describe the proposed method.
Target Game System
The proposed method is constructed on top of typical P2P-based game system such as [4] . In such a game system, player nodes first contact with a lobby server when logging in. Lobby server is used only for management of player accounts, which is just a light job and can be distributed to multiple computers. Other heavier jobs like event processing and delivering are performed by player nodes, and this makes it possible to realize MMORPG without dedicated servers or high speed network. In P2P-based game system, the game space is usually divided into subareas as shown in Fig. 1 , and a responsible node is selected from player nodes and assigned to each subarea, so that the global game state is maintained separately as the set of sub states for those subareas.
According to the game system in [4] , we assume that time Timeslot tn is a range of time [T0 + ∆ * n, T0 + ∆ * (n + 1)), where T0 is the starting time of game, ∆ is a constant value, and n is an integer number. The game space contains multiple objects. Moving objects including player characters and other static objects are all objects. An object has attributes like position in game space, state and so on.
For a subarea v and timeslot tn, a tuple of attributes of all objects in v is called the game state on v at tn, and denoted as GS (tn, v) . An event is an action taken by a player or an incident which affects the game state of the next timeslot. An event generated by player pi at timeslot tn is denoted as E(tn, pi). In this paper, we assume that each player generates at most one event in every timeslot and sends it to responsible node of its subarea. EL(tn, v) is the set of all events generated in a subarea v during timeslot tn, which is called event list.
Target Cheats to be Detected
In this paper, we deal with two types of cheats as follows: (1) Execution of events which are not permitted at current game state by malicious player node; (2) Falisification of events sent from player node by malicious responsible node.
The proposed method provides a way to detect the above two types of cheats as well as criminals and to correct the falsified game state to the valid one by rollback.
Assumption
We assume that all nodes participating the game has a pair of secret and public keys, and nodes are able to obtain a public key of any other node. We also assume that all player nodes have a random number seed after they log into the game system.
We regard that the whole game system is constructed as a set of finite state machines (FSMs) where each FSM corresponds to the sub game system on a subarea and transits every timeslot. That is, each state of the FSM for subarea v is GS (tn, v) , and GS(tn+1, v) can be uniquely determined by 
GS(tn, v) and EL(tn, v).
Responsible node receives events from player nodes on its responsible subarea, and generates an event list every timeslot. Then, the responsible node transmits the event list to all player nodes in the subarea. Each player node receives the event list from the responsible node, and it calculates the next state. Player nodes send events for the next time slot to the responsible node, and the game proceeds by repeating these steps.
Method for cheat detection
In order to detect cheats, the proposed method uses multiple monitor nodes for each subarea which are selected from player nodes similarly to the responsible node, and lets each player node sends its event not only to the responsible node but also to the monitor nodes as shown in Fig. 2 . The responsible node and the monitor nodes periodically compare their game states and events each other.
First of all, we give an explanation when a player node tries to forge an impossible event which is not allowed at the current game state. A player trying to use an item which is not possessed by the player is an example of this case. This can easily be prevented at responsible/monitor nodes by checking if there is a transition in FSM from the current state with a given event list (which may contain impossible event).
Even if neither nodes commit cheating, an event sent by a player node may be received by the responsible node and the monitor nodes at different timeslots due to network delay. If some events are assigned in different timeslots among responsible node and monitor nodes, they cannot track the same state in their FSMs and thereby cannot detect cheat.
In the proposed method, basically the responsible node and the monitor nodes follow majority decision to which timeslot each event belongs. However, conducting majority voting among nodes every timeslot may not be practical in terms of delay and message overhead. So, we reduce the number of voting by the following way.
When a player node sends an event, it attaches to the message the timeslot at which the event is sent. If the event is not received in the same timeslot and the delay is within a predetermined range (called discretion range), the respon- sible node determines which timeslot the event corresponds to. If the delay exceeds discretion range, voting takes place. The discretion range for each player node is adapted according to the average delay.
In the above mechanism, some malicious player nodes may try to disturb the smooth progress of game by intentionally delaying events to be sent so that voting frequently takes place. This can be avoided by prolonging the discretion range.
The responsible node may falsify the event list. This can be classified into two cases: the case that the responsible node falsifies the event list, and the case that the responsible node intentionally ignores some events received from some player nodes. In order to detect the former case, the proposed method uses digital signature. When player node sends event to the responsible node, it adds digital signature to the event message. In the proposed method, the responsible node and the monitor nodes compare events received by player nodes periodically, and authenticity for these events can be confirmed by checking the digital signatures. If the responsible node and the monitor nodes have authentic digital signatures for all events, in spite of having different game states, some player node is regarded to have sent different events to them at the same timeslot. An example of this situation is depicted in Fig. 3 . Otherwise, the responsible node or one of monitor nodes is regarded to have committed a cheat. Our method detects this case by letting each player node attach the hash value of the event list received at the last timeslot to an event which the player wants to generate at the current timeslot. An example of this situation is shown in Fig. 4 (a) . The latter case can be detected by majority voting among the responsible node and the monitor nodes.
Player node may try to entrap the responsible node or one of the monitor nodes, by sending a different event to the node as shown in Fig. 4 (b) . Our method can detect this case by letting responsible and monitor nodes to compare events with signatures received from each player node.
An outsider node may intrude between two nodes, and impersonate one of the nodes. This can be prevented by the lobby server issuing a public key certificate for each node. In order to prevent impersonating the lobby server, an existing method to prevent impersonating utilized on web is used.
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In order to add uncertainty to the game, a mechanism to generate random numbers is required. In our method, in order to maintain consistency among player nodes, the responsible node and the monitor nodes, all nodes retain a common random number seed. Since all player nodes know the seed, it may be possible to predict random numbers of the future, and thus it can, for example, attack at advantageous timing. This can be avoided by making each node to send a random number taken from its environment (e.g., /dev/urandom in Linux) as a part of event, and all nodes update the seed based on the numbers.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To evaluate the proposed method, we measured the time needed to detect a cheat and to correct the game state since a cheat is committed.
Environment
We conducted experiments on PlanetLab [5] which is a testbed consisting of many nodes distributed over the world. The number of responsible node, monitor nodes, and player nodes for a subarea are 1, 2 and 50, respectively. In order to show that the proposed method achieves practical performance even when the delay between nodes are large, we assigned responsible node and monitor nodes on terminals in Japan, and player nodes on terminals in West Coast of the USA. To simplify the experimental setting, we executed programs of five player nodes in one terminal of PlanetLab. Programs of responsible node and monitor nodes were executed on different nodes. Network delay between nodes within Japan was between 10 msec. and 20 msec., and that between USA and Japan was between 150 msec. and 300 msec.
Experiment
In the experiment, we let the responsible node commit cheat by sending falsified event list to player nodes every 1000 timeslots (corresponding to 300 sec.), and we measured time for a monitor node to detect the cheat after it is committed. In addition, we measured time to correct game state since detection of cheat. Fig. 5 shows packet flow from commitment of cheat to correction of the state.
Here, we set timeslot length to be 300 msec., and let all nodes to refer to the approximately same clock by giving the difference among clocks in advance. As a result, the time difference could be regulated within 20 msec. We repeated the above experiment 20 times and each of which was continued for 20,000 timeslots (e.g., 6000 sec.). Each player node sends an event to the responsible node and monitor nodes every timeslot. The responsible node aggregates received events in each timeslot and sends event list to player nodes.
Results
The average time to detect cheat and correct the game state by rollback was 1012 msec. and 8023 msec., respectively. Since the length of timeslot is 300 msec., and delay between nodes are about 200 msec., the time to detect cheating is considered to be reasonable. On the other hand, it took about 8 sec. to correct game state of player nodes. It would be practical if cheat is not so frequently committed.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a method to detect cheat for P2P-based MMORPG system. The proposed method makes it possible to detect cheat of sending falsified game state by a malicious responsible node and cheat of sending impossible event by malicious player nodes, by introducing monitor nodes which periodically check if the responsible node maintains the valid game state and makes majority decision to correct the game state if necessary. Through experiments in PlanetLab, we confirmed that the proposed method can detect cheat in short time with low overhead.
Part of future work includes experiments with larger number of monitor nodes and malicious player nodes to investigate the realiability of the proposed method, and enhancement of our method to be applied to non-timeslot based game architectures.
